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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare eect of privatization in a mixed
oligopoly model where multiple oligopolistic industries compete for a
common factor. We nd that privatization necessarily improves wel-
fare in a benchmark case with symmetric costs across all oligopolistic
industries. Moreover, we show that a production subsidy necessarily
reduces welfare regardless of the level of privatization.
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1 Introduction
Privatization of state-owned rms has been as controversial as the other lib-
eralization policies, e.g. competition and trade policies. Reason Foundation
(2015) reports the latest cases of successful privatization in the United States
in 2014.1 Moreover, `Many emerging economies have launched ambitious ef-
forts to privatize their infrastructure industries' (Jiang et al., 2015, p. 294)
in order to provide multinational enterprises with investment opportunities.
These facts motivate a large literature on the eects of privatization
mainly in the context of a mixed oligopoly.2 This literature begins with
de Fraja and Delbono (1989) who show that moving from full nationaliza-
tion to full privatization improves welfare. By allowing for the intermediate
case between full nationalization and full privatization, Matsumura (1998)
nds that partial privatization is optimal (welfare-maximizing). In addition
to the eects of privatization alone, White (1996) examines the interplay be-
tween privatization and subsidization, demonstrating that privatization has
no eect on the optimal production subsidy when the government subsidizes
both the state-owned and private rms.3
This strand of literature leads to a number of useful implications, but they
rest on a partial equilibrium model. The purpose of this paper is to examine
the welfare eects of privatization and subsidization by taking into account
the general equilibrium eects through the factor market. To this end, we
combine Matsumura's (1998) approach with the model of Dixit and Gross-
man (1986) in which multiple oligopolistic industries compete for a common
factor. In this setting with identical production costs across all oligopolistic
industries, we establish two results. First, any privatization improves welfare,
1According to this report, `The U.S. Department of Agriculture announced a plan to
privatize poultry inspection in 2014,' and `The General Services Administration announced
in January it is closing its warehouses    and will no longer buy, ship or store oce
supplies, tools and other common-use retail items in favor of accepting agency orders.'
2For an extensive literature survey, see Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) and Matsumura
and Tomaru (2012). Cato and Matsumura (2015) provide a further review by paying
special attention to the open economy case.
3This `irrelevance result' or `Privatization Neutrality Theorem' has been challenged by
many works, which are surveyed in Matsumura and Okumura (2013) in detail.
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and hence full privatization turns to be optimal. Second, any subsidization
reduces welfare, and thus zero subsidy is optimal irrespective of the degree
of privatization. Both of these results are hopefully useful in the sense that
they convince us the importance of general equilibrium considerations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model, Section
3 states the main results, and Section 4 concludes. Technical arguments are
summarized in Appendix.
2 Model
The model follows Dixit and Grossman (1986). There are n + 1; n  1
duopolistic industries. In industry 1, one state-owned rm (rm 1) and one
private rm (rm 2) play a Cournot game while the other industries are a
standard Cournot duopoly by private rms. In industry i, each rm employs
one unit of capital and ai units of labor to produce one unit of output. In
addition, the government subsidizes both rms in industry 1. Then, letting
xi1 and x
i
2 denote output of rms 1 and 2 in industry i, the prot of each rm
of industry 1 is dened by
11  p

x11 + x
1
2

x11   (a1 + r   s)x11
12  p

x11 + x
1
2

x12   (a1 + r   s)x12;
where p() is an inverse demand function with p0() < 0, r is capital rental,
and s is a per-unit production subsidy.4 Similarly, the prot of duopolists in
private sectors i = 2;    ; n+ 1 is dened by
i1  p

xi1 + x
i
2

xi1   (ai + r)xi1
i2  p

xi1 + x
i
2

xi2   (ai + r)xi2:
Following Matsumura (1998), the state-owned rm in industry 1 is as-
sumed to maximize the weighted sum of prot and welfare. In order to
4Note that the wage rate is normalized to one by implicitly assuming that one unit of
labor produces one unit of the numeraire good.
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dene the public rm's objective, we now compute welfare. Denoting by y
output of the numeraire good, the market-clearing conditions for labor and
capital are given by
y +
n+1X
i=1
ai

xi1 + x
i
2

 y +
n+1X
i=1
aiX
i = l (1)
n+1X
i=1

xi1 + x
i
2

=
n+1X
i=1
X i = k; (2)
where X i  xi1 + xi2 is total output in industry i, and l and k are the
endowment of labor and capital, respectively. These conditions and some
rearrangements lead to national income I:
I 
n+1X
i=1

i1 + 
i
2

| {z }
aggregate prots in oligopolistic industries
+ y   y| {z }
prot in the numeraire industry
+ l + rk| {z }
factor income
 s

x11 + x
1
2

| {z }
subsidy payment
=
n+1X
i=1
h
p

X i

X i   aiX i
i
+ l:
Consumer surplus CS is
CS 
n+1X
i=1
"Z Xi
0
p(Q)dQ  p

X i

X i
#
:
Summing CS and I up, welfare W is obtained as
W  CS + I =
n+1X
i=1
"Z Xi
0
p(Q)dQ  aiX i
#
+ l: (3)
As mentioned earlier, the state-owned rm (rm 1) in industry 1 chooses
x11 to maximize the weighted sum of its own prot and welfare 
1
1+(1 )W
where  2 [0; 1] represents the degree of privatization;  = 0 (resp.  = 1)
corresponds full nationalization (resp. privatization). Then, the rst-order
conditions for objective maximization are derived as follows.

h
x11p
0 X1  r + si+ p X1  a1 = 0 (4)
4
x12p
0 X1+ p X1  a1   r + s = 0 (5)
xi1p
0 X i+ p X i  ai   r = 0 (6)
xi2p
0 X i+ p X i  ai   r = 0; (7)
where (4) is the rst-order condition of the state-owned rm in industry 1,
(5) is the counterpart of the private rm in industry 1, and (6) and (7) are
the prot-maximization conditions in industry i; i = 2;    ; n+1. Our model
consists of Eqs. (2), (4), (5), (6) and (7), and determines x11; x
1
2; x
i
1; x
i
2 and r.
3 Results
Using the above model, this section examines the welfare eects of privati-
zation (an increase in ) and production subsidy.5 To simplify analysis, let
us multiply (5) by  and sum the resulting equation and (4). Then, we have

h
X1p0

X1

+ p

X1

  a1   2r + 2s
i
+ p

X1

  a1 = 0: (8)
Summing (6) and (7) up yields
X ip0

X i

+ 2p

X i

  2ai   2r = 0: (9)
Thus, the model reduces to Eqs. (2), (8) and (9), which determines X1; X i
and r. As in the literature that assumes a Cournot duopoly, we make:
Assumption: xi1p
00 (X i) + p0 (X i) < 0 and xi2p
00 (X i) + p0 (X i) < 0
This assumption, which is familiar in the literature, requires the inverse
demand function not to be too convex. Then, totally dierentiating the
above n+ 2-system, we have:6
Lemma.
@X1
@
< 0;
@X i
@
> 0; i = 2;    ; n+ 1 and @r
@
< 0.
5The simplest case of two oligopolistic industries is in Appendix.
6Main results are proved in Appendix.
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The intuition behind this result is as follows. From Eqs. (4) and (5),
marginal revenue of the semi-public rm (rm 1) in industry 1 decreases,
but that of the private rm (rm 2) is unchanged as a result of an increase
in . This leads rm 1 to produce less, and rm 2 to produce more, but
total output decreases because rm 1's output reduction dominates rm 2's
output expansion. This reduction in X1 puts upward pressure on r, and the
decline in r increases outputs in the other oligopolistic industries.
Dierentiating (3) with respect to  and using the above lemma, we arrive
at:
Proposition 1. If all oligopolistic industries have the identical technology,
privatization necessarily improves welfare, and hence full privatization is op-
timal.
It is easily inferred from (3) that welfare eects of privatization are
unclear if ai diers across industries. However, if all the oligopolistic in-
dustries have the same production cost, privatization becomes necessarily
benecial. The reason is as follows. As shown in Appendix, it holds that
X1 > X i; i = 2    ; n + 1, that is, the market distortion associated with im-
perfect competition is stronger in industry i than in industry 1. Privatization-
led increase in X i and decrease in X1 plays a role in mitigating this stronger
distortion in industry i, and thus enhances welfare.
Noting that the eects of privatization (an increase in ) and subsidization
(an increase in s) have the opposite sign, we nd:
Proposition 2. If all oligopolistic industries have the identical technology,
privatization has no eect on the optimal subsidy, which is always zero.
Subsidizing industry 1 increases its output, from which the capital rental
rises. This rise in r increases marginal cost of the other oligopolistic indus-
tries, and decreases their output. As a result of these eects, subsidization
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negatively aects welfare because it makes market distortion in industry i
stronger than before. To sum, subsidization to industry 1 crowds the other
oligopolistic industries out, thereby yielding welfare losses.
It follows from the above observation that the benevolent government
chooses zero subsidy, which is not aected by the degree of privatization. In
this sense, Proposition 2 may be a special case of the `irrelevance result' or
the `Privatization Neutrality Theorem.'
4 Conclusion
We have reconsidered two results concerning privatization of a semi-public
rm by highlighting general equilibrium eects in the factor market. In our
model, it is shown that if all the oligopolistic industries have the same tech-
nology, (i) privatization is necessarily improves welfare, and (ii) the optimal
production subsidy is zero and is not aected by the degree of privatization.
The general equilibrium eects mentioned earlier play a crucial role behind
these results.
Our results may contribute to the literature on privatization and mixed
oligopoly, but they admittedly rest on a number of simplifying assumptions.
Among others, we have assumed a quasi-linear preference by strictly following
Dixit and Grossman (1986). However, if one considers fully general equilib-
rium eects, the assumption of a quasi-linear preference must be dropped so
that the income eect is taken into account. Neary (2009), in the context of
international trade, develops such a model, and his model has been increas-
ingly applied in a variety of elds.7 It is our future research agenda to extend
our results to such a richer model.
7See Colacicco (2014) for the comprehensive survey on Neary's (2009) approach.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma
Totally dierentiating the n + 2-dimensional system of (2), (8) and (9), the
eects of an increase in  on X1; X i; i = 2;    ; n+ 1 become
@X1
@
=
2A

0B@ X
i6=j 6=6=k
BiBj   Bk| {z }
n 1
1CA (10)
@X i
@
=  2A


n+1Y
j 6=1;i
Bj (11)
@r
@
=  A


n+1Y
i=2
Bi; (12)
where  is the determinant of the coecient matrix of the totally-dierentiated
system, and is positive (resp. negative) if the number of oligopolistic indus-
tries n + 1 is odd (resp. even). Concretely,  and the other notations are
dened by
  2
8><>:
h


X1p001 + p
0
1

+ p01
i X
i6=j 6=6=k
BiBj   Bk| {z }
n 1
+
n+1Y
i=2
Bi
9>=>;
A   

X1p01 + p1   a1   2r + 2s

> 0
Bi  X ip00i + 3p0i < 0:
These sign patterns lead to
@X1
@
< 0;
@X i
@
> 0;
@r
@
< 0:
The eects of subsidization can be obtained just by replacing A in (10), (11)
and (12) with  2, and hence
@X1
@s
=  4

0B@ X
i6=j 6=6=k
BiBj   Bk| {z }
n 1
1CA > 0 (13)
@X i
@s
=
4


n+1Y
j 6=1;i
Bj < 0 (14)
@r
@s
=
2


n+1Y
i=2
Bi > 0: (15)
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Proof of Proposition 1
Dierentiating (3) with respect to , the welfare eect of privatization is
computed as
@W
@
=
n+1X
i=1
h
p

X i

  ai
i @X i
@
=
2A

8><>:
h
p

X1

  a1
i X
i6=j 6=6=k
BiBj   Bk| {z }
n 1
 
h
p

X i

  ai
i n+1Y
j 6=i;j=2
Bj
9>=>; :
(16)
Although the sign of (16) is ambiguous, it can be shown to be positive if all the
oligopolistic industries have the same technology, i.e. a1 = a2 =    = an+1.
In this case, (16) simplies to
@W
@
=
2A

8<:
n+1X
i=2
h
p

X1

  p

X i
i n+1Y
j 6=i;j=2
Bj
9=; :
Since comparing (8) and (9) allows us to know that X1 > X i and p (X1) <
p (X i), @W=@ becomes necessarily positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
Dierentiating (3) with respect to s and setting a1 = a2 =    = an+1, we get
@W
@s
=  4

8<:
n+1X
i=2
h
p

X1

  p

X i
i n+1Y
j 6=i;j=2
Bj
9=; < 0;
by making an argument parallel with the eect of privatization. As a result,
it is optimal to choose zero subsidy, and the degree of privatization has no
eect on the optimal subsidy.
Special case of two oligopolistic sectors
In the simplest case of two oligopolistic industries,  is negative and the
comparative statics outcomes are obtained as
@X1
@
=
2A

< 0;
@X2
@
=  2A

> 0;
@r
@
=  (X
2p002 + 3p
0
2)A

< 0
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@X1
@s
=  4

> 0;
@X2
@s
=
4

< 0;
@r
@s
=
2 (X2p002 + 3p
0
2)

> 0:
The welfare eect of privatization and production subsidy is then
@W
@
=
2A

h
p

X1

  a1   p

X2

+ a2
i
@W
@s
=  4

h
p

X1

  a1   p

X2

+ a2
i
:
While the sign of these equations is generally ambiguous, @W=@ > 0 and
@W=@s < 0 in the special case with a1 = a2.
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